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Equality Under the Constitution: Reclaiming the Four-
teenth Amendment. By Judith A. Baer. * Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press. 1983. Pp. 308. $3 7.50 clothbound, $17.50 
paperbound. 
Daniel A. Farber** 
This book makes two arguments. One is an attack on current 
equal protection doctrine. This is not an especially hard argument 
to make. It has been common knowledge for at least a decade 
that equal protection law is a mess. Also, as Professor Baer points 
out, the current doctrines (suspect classes, strict scrutiny, etc.) are 
largely judicial inventions. They have only the weakest connec-
tion with the fourteenth amendment's language or history. The 
book's other argument is that these current doctrines should be 
replaced with much more liberal rules. Baer describes herself as a 
"bleeding-heart liberal."' In this book, she attempts to provide a 
constitutional basis for familiar liberal demands such as affirma-
tive action, more money for the handicapped, limits on mandatory 
retirement, legalization of homosexuality, and expanded rights for 
children. 
The temptation is to respond with the familiar refrain that 
Baer's program should be addressed to legislatures rather than 
federal judges. I will not do so here. That response has been 
made too often and too well to require repetition. Besides, it's not 
as if anyone else has solved the problem of judicial review. It 
seems unfair to criticize Baer for failing to take on what may be 
an impossible task. Indeed, it is beginning to look as if we could 
spend the rest of human history debating theories of judicial re-
view without making any significant progress.2 Sooner or later we 
are going to have to stop worrying about the abstract question of 
how to decide issues and get on with the concrete work of decid-
• Assistant Professor of Political Science, State University of New York at Albany. 
•• Professor of Law, University of Minnesota. 
I. J. BAER, EQUALITY UNDER THE CONSTITUTION 10 (1983). 
2. As far as I can tell, the debate has not significantly advanced since the first half of 
the 19th century, when rather similar arguments were made on both sides. For citations, 
see Farber & Meunch, The ldealogica/ Origins of the Fourteenth Amendment, I CoNST. 
COMM. 235, 245-246 (1984). 
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ing them. So, I will skip the usual business about democracy and 
judicial restraint, and move on to the merits of Baer's proposals. 
The flavor of her argument comes across best in her discus-
sion of children's rights. Her central argument is quite simple: 
One of the most important lessons I have learned in and from the women's libera-
tion movement has been to suspect any generalizations about the abilities and 
characteristics of groups of people-not only to question their validity, which is 
easy. but to think about the reasons why such generalizations are made and the 
purposes they serve. Such remarks as "Woman's place is in the home," "Twelve-
year-olds aren't mature enough to decide where they want to live," and "Deaf 
people can't be nurses"-all of which come into this book-are general state-
ments that are hard to verify and may well be wrong. Less obviously, such re-
marks are ways of assigning roles and allocating power. They keep some people 
in certain places and our of other places, which are thereby reserved for other 
people. Such statements are ways of preserving inequality. That insight led me to 
a central thesis of this work. 3 
Perhaps Professor Baer finds this argument plausible because she 
has previously devoted much attention to the evils of treating wo-
men as if they were children or physically handicapped.4 But 
there is a considerable gap between "it's wrong to treat women as 
children," and "it's wrong to treat children as children." No 
doubt, the reasons for denying various rights to twelve-year-olds 
are generalizations, and no doubt those generalizations are be-
lieved most fervently by many of the same people who are wrong 
about women. But one might as well argue that cigarettes are safe 
because doctors used to have stupid ideas about the harmfulness 
of night vapors, and anyway "it's only a statistic that cigarettes 
cause lung cancer." 
This argument is not an aberration but instead is echoed 
throughout the book.s For example, her concluding words on 
children's rights are these: 
I began this chapter by noting the general public acceptance that age-based dis-
criminations have received. The ensuing discussion has shown that case law has 
mirrored this acceptance. But the cases have also revealed the prevalence of as-
sumptions that claims to equality must rest on capacity and competence; again 
and again, laws are defended by generalizations about lack of competence. And 
while these generalizations may be more accurate than some that have been made 
about other groups, their application to individuals is limited. They correspond 
better to the anti theory of equality than to the theory. And they are not compati-
ble with a right to equal respect and concern, or with a commitment to individual 
rights6 
It never seems to have occurred to Professor Baer that individual-
3. J. BAER, supra note I. at II. 
4. J. BAER, THE CHAINS OF PROTECTION (1978). 
5. See 1. BAER, supra note I, at 26, 30, 150, 158-59, 218, 273. 
6. /d. at 189. 
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ized procedures may not be universally practical in a nation of 240 
million, or that individualized treatment may lead to arbitrary re-
sults, or that statistical methods may often be more reliable than 
individualized judgments. 1 
Since Professor Baer thinks it wrong to legislate on the basis 
of children's lack of competence, she naturally wants to give them 
more adult rights. Logically, if children are to be treated as hav-
ing the same capacities as adults, toddlers should be allowed to 
vote, sit on juries, and work in factories (with student loans for 
those who prefer school). Professor Baer is not prepared to go 
quite as far as that,s but she is willing to go quite far indeed: 
The question of how to discriminate between acceptable and unacceptable restric-
tions on children is perplexing. Any argument for "children's rights," even so 
limited an argument as I have made, is easy to trivializ.e. As one author asks, 
what happens if "my son, who gets mad at going to bed at 10:30, goes to cciurt and 
asks for a later bedtime?" The leading cases do not help us to make these 
discriminations. . . . 
But if courts begin to uphold children's claims, will such rulings encourage 
bedtime litigation? Do not families and schools-and courts, too-need to main-
tain a considerable degree of control over children, and would such rulings not 
make it harder for them to do so? I am not sure that they would, because they 
only scratch the surface of children's disabilities. But if they did, I am not sure 
that would be a bad idea. It is not clear to me why disrespect for a principal, 
dawdling, or being with a child who steals a wallet should be punishable offenses. 
The larger point is that it is not clear why the first, most powerful lessons that 
children-who, after all, will grow up--must learn are obedience and respect for 
authority. 9 
This passage has several striking features. First is Professor 
Baer's assumption that children are short adults, with the same 
psychological need for independence from authority. Many who 
have made studying children their life work would disagree. to In-
deed, one has the distinct impression that Baer has read about 
children but never actually met one.tt Second is the extraordinary 
vagueness of her position.12 How can her proposal be assessed 
7. See R. NISBETI & L. Ross, HUMAN INFERENCE: STRATEGIES AND SHORTCOM-
INGS Of SOCIAL JUDGMENT 140-41 (1980); P. MEEHL, PsYCHODIAGNOSIS: SELECTED PA-
PERS 81-89 (1973). 
8. She grudgingly accepts compulsory education, see J. BAER, supra note I, at 187-
188, though she appears to have some doubts about the validity of child labor laws. See id. 
at 157 (complaining that children are "not allowed to earn a living wage"). 
9. /d. at 188. 
10. See J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A. SoHNIT, BEFORE THE BEST INTERESTS Of THE 
CHILD 3-14, 124-25, 197-202, 206 (1979). 
II. For example, she assumes that six-year-olds are fully capable of deciding whether 
to go to school, except for the possibility that their selfish parents might pressure them not 
to. J. BAER, supra note I, at 173. 
12. This is also true of Professor Baer's discussion of the handicapped. a group she 
never defines. If she were writing legislation (or a constitutional amendment), we would 
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when she hasn't defined it clearly? Third is her cultural imperial-
ism-the attempt to impose the middle class Dr. Spock on the rest 
of society. The families who will suffer the most from government 
intervention under Baer's proposal are probably those who suffer 
the most today. They are the "lower class, ethnically or racially 
different from the personnel of intervention agencies, [who] often 
do not share the middle class values that those agencies believe 
(on the basis of very little evidence) are vital to healthy child 
development." 13 
As the preceeding discussion suggests, this is a deeply flawed 
book. But Professor Baer is clearly an intelligent, capable scholar. 
Her research is broad; her writing is good; many of her remarks 
are shrewd and trenchant. For example, she scores some very 
good points against historians as good as Charles Fairman.I4 Her 
treatment of affirmative action goes beyond the usual argument 
that whites aren't stigmatized and attempts to take seriously some 
of the counterarguments.Is Many of her comments on particular 
cases are insightful. Why has a good scholar produced such a 
weak book? 
The answer, I think, can best be described as "creeping 
Dworkinism."I6 In part this is a specific reference to Professor 
Ronald Dworkin's imprint on Baer's work.n For instance, she 
constantly refers to his slogan of "equal respect and concern" as 
the core of her analysis. Is But more generally I mean the idea that 
important social issues can be settled through philosophical analy-
sis, by staring into our navels and thinking hard about Justice. 
Typical of this is Professor Baer's insistence that transportation 
certainly expect more clarity. Advocating a change in constitutional interpretation ought 
to carry with it a similar requirement to specify the scope of the proposal. 
13. Levy, The Rights of Parents, 3 B.Y.L.U. 693, 700 (1976). See also J. GoLDSTEIN, 
A. FREUD & A. SOHNIT, supra note 10, at 17. 
14. Baer rightly chides Fairman and Raoul Berger for dismissing the drafters of the 
founeenth amendment as muddled thinkers, as if legislators have to pass some kind of I.Q. 
test before their intent counts. As Baer points out, the negative appraisals of the framers 
are largely due to attempts to read 20th-century ideas into the 19th-century debates. See J. 
BAER, supra note I, at 101. 
15. She is seriously concerned that some affirmative action programs may be based 
on demeaning stereotypes. She also acknowledges that some situations such as punishment 
call for treatment on the basis of individual merit, and that affirmative action may in ex-
treme cases place too heavy a burden on members of the majority. See id. at 149-51. This 
is probably the most thoughtful pan of the book. 
16. As the discussion in the text should make clear, I am referring to Ronald rather 
than Andrea Dworkin, the feminist author. 
17. At one point Baer comes very close to saying that the founeenth amendment 
enacts Dworkin's book, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977). See ]. BAER, supra note I, at 
268-69. She might have done better to focus on John Rawls's much more sophisticated and 
thoughtful work, which Dworkin popularizes. 
18. See J. BAER, supra note I, at 32, 34, 102, 129, 180, 189, 259, 262. 
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methods for the handicapped are a matter of principle-of "equal 
respect and concern" -rather than a matter of costs and benefits. t9 
This tum toward philosophy (especially neo-Kantian philosophy) 
seems to be enjoying great popularity among liberals at the 
moment. 
One reason for the attraction of neo-Kantian philosophy is 
that it strips away almost everything concrete about human rela-
tions, leaving only a collection of atomistic individuals. This is an 
attractive viewpoint, if like Baer you believe that families, com-
munities, and other social institutions are primarily instruments of 
oppression.2o Given this viewpoint, the normative human condi-
tion is the isolated individual, just as in Kantian analysis.21 
Probably a more important reason for the tum toward philos-
ophy is political. Liberals like Professor Baer have lost much of 
their faith in legislatures and other democratic institutions. They 
see the courts as the only salvation for individual rights. Professor 
Baer, for example, has no hope of getting her program adopted 
democratically. Despite the realities of Title VII, the Voting 
Rights Act, and other major legislation,n she doubts whether leg-
islatures have ever done much for equality. More important, she 
says that "Americans do not believe in equality at all."23 The best 
that can be done with such a benighted people is to coerce them 
into doing the right thing; they will never do it voluntarily. If the 
only forum for change is the courts, abstract principles seem more 
appropriate than more empirical policy arguments. 
In these respects, Dworkinism fits the perceived needs of 
some liberals to free individuals from social institutions while 
bypassing the democratic process. But it also has another appeal. 
Looking out at the real world is risky. You never know what you 
might find. Philosophical introspection is much less likely to tum 
up any unpleasant surprises. 
As Professor Baer's book helps show, Dworkinism has 
proved a dangerous course for liberalism. It has helped lock liber-
19. /d. at 194, 209-10. 
20. See J. BAER, supra note I, at 162 (parental power based on "physical prowess and 
power of the family purpose"); id. at 166-67 (no evidence that parents generally act in 
children's interest); id. at 173 (only reason for compulsory educallon 1s that otherwise self-
ish parents might prevent children from going to school). 
21. For an excellent analysis of this point, see M. SANDEL, LIBERALISM A"'D THE 
LIMITS OF JUSTICE (1982). 
22. With the exception of one decade (1954-1964), it cenainly is unclear that the 
Supreme Court has historically been a better guardian of minorities than Congress. See 
Nowak, Professor Rodell, the Burger Court, and Public Opinion, I CoNsT. CoMM. 107. 111-
114 (1984). 
23. J. BAER, supra note I, at 7. 
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als into stale solutions by denying them fresh knowledge. It has 
directed them away from legislatures and toward the courts, in 
what appears likely to become an increasingly unprofitable search 
for the Supreme Court's assistance. It has also distorted the lib-
eral agenda. Affirmative action lends itself to Dworkinian analy-
sis and gets a chapter in Baer's book. Black unemployment is not 
suited to this analysis and receives not a single mention. Nor do 
poverty or wealth raise significant issues for Professor Baer. 
These issues need to get back on the liberal agenda. It is time, in 
other words, for liberal legal thinkers to come out of their philo-
sophical reverie and back into the real world. 
